Corporate governance reform and risk-taking:evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in an emerging market by Koirala, Santosh et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Corporate governance reform and risk-taking
Koirala, Santosh; Marshall, Andrew; Neupane, Suman; Thapa, Chandra
DOI:
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.08.007
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Koirala, S, Marshall, A, Neupane, S & Thapa, C 2018, 'Corporate governance reform and risk-taking: evidence
from a quasi-natural experiment in an emerging market', Journal of Corporate Finance.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.08.007
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility: 20/09/2019
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 14. Jun. 2020
  
Corporate Governance Reform and Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural 
Experiment in an Emerging Market 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Existing studies suggest that stricter Corporate Governance Reform (CGR) reduces corporate 
risk-taking, primarily due to higher compliance costs and expanded liabilities of insiders or 
managers. We revisit the relationship between CGR and risk-taking in an emerging market set-
up characterized by weaker market forces of corporate scrutiny and greater insider ownership, 
which encourages firms to pursue investment conservatism. Using a quasi-natural experiment, 
we find that stricter CGR leads to greater corporate risk-taking. We further show that risk-
taking is an important channel through which CGR enhances firm value. Our findings support 
the view that stricter CGR can have a positive effect on corporate risk-taking and corporate 
investment decisions in an evolving regulatory environment. 
 
JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38 
Keywords: corporate governance reform; risk-taking; emerging market; quasi-natural 
experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Studies on corporate governance reform (CGR) show that it discourages corporate risk-
taking. These findings, which are primarily based on the experience of adopting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, suggest that CGR that expands the personal liability of decision-
makers for non-compliance increases the compliance burden, shrinks managerial flexibility, and 
discourages managers or insiders from undertaking potentially value-enhancing risky projects. 
Empirical evidence from Bargeron et al. (2010) that documents a reduction in the appetite for risk-
taking among US firms following the introduction of SOX supports this view. They argue that the 
increased financial and criminal liability imposed by SOX reduces insiders’ motivation to pursue 
risky investments. Cohen and Dey (2013) offer a similar argument and note that the reduced risk-
taking activities of US firms following the implementation of SOX is partly due to the expanded 
personal liability of corporate insiders.1 
There is an alternative view that predicts a positive relationship between CGR and risk-
taking to the extent that CGR improves corporate scrutiny and the monitoring of insiders. John et 
al. (2008) show that corporate risk-taking is higher in firms operating in better governed 
environments. They argue that corporate risk-taking involves a utility trade-off for insiders 
between the wealth effect from risky investments and extraction of private benefits.2 Better 
investor protection not only lowers the magnitude and importance of private benefits but also 
reduces the cost of capital, thereby creating a higher wealth effect of investments (Stulz, 1999; 
                                                 
1 Another strand of literature contends that a negative relationship exists between excessive investor protection and 
value-relevant risk-taking, based on the argument that excessive shareholder empowerment leads to short-term 
opportunism at the cost of value-relevant, long-term (risky) investments (Belloc, 2013; Honoré et al., 2015). 
2 Utility from private benefits are derived from the ability of controlling insiders to consume resources which could 
either be monetary, such as very high salary for the block-holding insiders, or non-monetary, such as the amenities 
that come from controlling establishments, such as professional sport clubs, newspapers, and other social clubs 
(Paligorova, 2010). 
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Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Thus, CGR, which increases investor protection, should increase insiders’ appetite for 
potentially value-maximizing risky investments by shifting their utility toward the wealth effect of 
investment and away from the extraction of private benefits. 
These two opposing views on the effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking motivate our 
empirical study. Moreover, our study focuses on a relatively weaker investor protection 
environment in an emerging market, where, compared to its developed market counterparts, 
concentrated ownership structures accentuate the conflict of interest between controlling insiders 
and minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Stulz, 2005; Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013). For instance, Stulz (2005) notes that firms in countries with relatively weaker 
investor protection systems have dominant insiders with significant control over the resources that 
they use for private benefits.3 Therefore, in an environment with relatively weaker market-based 
monitoring, stricter CGR can substitute the missing market forces of corporate scrutiny 
(Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). The resulting substitutive effect of regulatory reform could, 
therefore, alter insiders’ utility trade-off to pursue corporate risk-taking. 
After a few years of initial groundwork, India implemented a major CGR in 2000 with the 
adoption of Clause-49, introducing greater disclosure requirements, board independence, and 
transparency. However, following Dharmapala and Khanna (2013), we primarily focus on the 
2004 amendment of the Securities Contracts Act, 1956, which introduced Section 23E. Section 
23E expanded the personal liabilities of the management, the board, and the auditors, and imposed 
                                                 
3 Using a de facto measure of firm level corporate governance standards, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) show that 
emerging markets’ firms score much lower than the firms in developed markets. Similarly, Stulz (2005) shows that 
the potential risks of expropriation (on a scale of 0-10 with the higher value indicating a lower risk of expropriation) 
during the year 2002 for the US and the UK were 9.98 and 9.71 respectively. The figure for India in the same period 
was 7.75. He further shows that for 2002 (a period covered by our sample), the value-weighted percentage of market 
capitalization held by corporate insiders was 58%. This is compared to the figures of 16% and 11% for the US and 
the UK respectively. 
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significant financial and criminal penalties for non-compliance with the provisions listed under 
Clause-49. As the applicability of Clause-49 was based on the threshold of paid-up equity capital, 
only listed firms that had paid-up equity capital of more than or equal to Indian Rupees (INR) 30 
million at any point in their traded history were required to comply with this CGR. Thus, the 
imposition of stricter provisions of Section 23E, along with the exogenously separated treated and 
control groups of firms based on paid-up equity capital, provides us with a regulatory set-up to 
empirically examine the following three hypotheses relating to CGR and corporate risk-taking. 
Our primary hypothesis examines whether the more stringent Section 23E, as introduced in 2004, 
deters or encourages corporate risk-taking activities in India. Second, since the literature suggests 
that investment conservatism may stem from the concentrated stakes of insiders, we examine 
whether CGR could play a moderating role in the link between risk-taking and variations in 
ownership concentration. Finally, given the evidence that CGR affects firm valuation positively, 
we test whether corporate risk-taking could potentially be an important channel in influencing firm 
valuation.4 
Employing Regression Discontinuity (RD) around the threshold of paid-up equity capital 
and propensity matched difference-in-differences (PSM-DiD) design on a sample of listed non-
financial Indian firms for the period between 2000 and 2007, we find strong evidence that CGR is 
positively related to earnings-volatility, which is our core measure of corporate risk-taking. We 
also use capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as additional corporate investment proxies to 
assess the impact of CGR on fixed and innovative investments respectively. Our results are similar 
and economically significant with these additional corporate investment proxies. Overall, the 
results suggest that CGR that expands significant financial and criminal penalties for corporate 
                                                 
4 See section 3 for relevant literature and discussion on developing all three hypotheses. 
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insiders may mitigate their investment conservatism and encourage them to undertake risky and 
value-enhancing investment projects.5 These findings are in line with the economic perspective 
that predicts a rise in corporate risk-taking activities following improvement in the corporate 
governance regime through stringent sanctions (Stulz, 2005; John et al., 2008). This key finding 
of our study is robust to a series of robustness tests, including the use of alternative control and 
treatment groups, placebo experimentation, and self-selection bias (see Section 5.4). 
Our examination of the possible moderating role of CGR on risk-taking across different 
ownership concentrations finds that, following CGR, firms with higher ownership concentration 
tend to take more risks relative to firms with lower ownership concentration. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical argument that CGR reduces the utility derived from private benefits 
and increases the utility derived from value-enhancing risky investments for concentrated insiders, 
thereby encouraging them to undertake risky investments (Bertrand et al., 2002; John et al., 2008; 
Gul et al., 2010). Finally, the results pertaining to the value-implication of corporate risk-taking 
show that, after the CGR enforcement period of 2004, higher risk-taking is associated with a higher 
market valuation of the treated firms. This finding suggests that risk-taking is an important channel 
through which CGR provides value to a firm. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we add to the ongoing 
debate of whether CGR deters or encourages risk-taking. Our study suggests that the effect of CGR 
on risk-taking could be context dependent, where, in an emerging market set-up, CGR can 
positively affect corporate risk-taking. Although CGR could add an additional compliance burden, 
                                                 
5 As Clause-49 was introduced in 2000, we also examine whether the initial introduction of CGR in 2000 has any 
visible effect on corporate risk-taking, but find no evidence of it. This additional test further suggests that CGR affects 
corporate risk-taking positively in an evolving corporate governance regime when interventions are accompanied by 
additional expansion of personal liability and stricter financial and criminal sanctions for non-compliance 
(Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). 
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thus reducing the appetite for risk-taking (Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen and Dey, 2013), our study 
shows that CGR could substitute the missing market-based corporate scrutiny and reduce 
investment conservatism, thereby encouraging value-relevant risk-taking in a set-up characterized 
by weaker market-based corporate governance. 
Second, our paper also adds to the literature that relates ownership concentration to 
corporate risk-taking. Given the evidence that firms with concentrated insiders’ ownership prefer 
risk avoidance (Bertrand et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2010; Paligorova, 2010; Faccio et al., 2011), we 
contribute by showing that CGR positively moderates the link between ownership concentration 
and risk-taking behavior of firms that would otherwise pursue investment conservatism. Finally, 
the literature supports the positive impact of CGR on firm valuation, specifically in the case of 
emerging markets (Fauver et al., 2017; Black and Khanna, 2007; Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). 
We extend this literature by suggesting that higher risk-taking could be an important channel 
through which CGR may augment higher firm valuation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief explanation of 
Clause-49. Section 3 develops our hypotheses, which is followed by a discussion of the data in 
Section 4. Section 5 examines the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Clause-49 
2.1. Background 
The corporate governance environment in India was largely informal prior to the 
introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). However, as Indian companies 
began to seek external financing, this led to the need for a sound regulatory framework for 
corporate governance to ensure better investor protection. In 1998, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) introduced the voluntary Corporate Governance Code, which was adopted by only 
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a few major companies. Thus, the consensus among Indian policy-makers was that a mandatory 
set of corporate governance rules was necessary. Consequently, the Code evolved into the 
mandatory Clause-49 provisions in February 2000. Clause-49 of the stock exchange listing 
agreement is a set of CGRs enacted by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the 
governing body of listed companies in India.6 Clause-49 introduced greater compliance, as well as 
enhanced disclosure, transparency, and board independence, with initial provisions of stock 
delisting for non-compliance. Appendix 1 highlights the key features of Clause-49. 
Only firms that had achieved a paid-up equity capital of more than or equal to INR 30 million 
or a net worth of INR 250 million at any point in their history since being listed were initially 
subject to Clause-49. As shown in Figure 1, Clause-49 provides a phased-in implementation period 
during which larger firms are required to comply first, followed by mid-sized firms and, finally, 
small-sized firms. However, firms that are listed for the first time from 2000 onward are required 
to comply immediately, regardless of whether they meet the criteria of paid-up capital or net worth. 
This implies that our control group comprises firms that are listed prior to 2000 and that do not 
meet the two threshold criteria imposed by the reform. 
…Insert Figure 1 about here… 
In 2004, the amendment to the Securities Contracts Act, 1956 included Section 23E, which 
expanded the personal liabilities of the management, the board, and the audit committee, and 
imposed significant financial and criminal penalties for violations of the listing agreement (up to 
INR 250 million per violation). Further, Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) maintain that the threat 
of stricter punishment and expansion of personal liability improves the expected enforcement of 
                                                 
6 Clause-49 is popularly referred to as the SOX of India. Black and Khanna (2007) offer a comparison between Clause-
49 and SOX. Further details on Clause-49 can be obtained from the website of the SEBI 
(http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/Clause-49.html). 
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CGR in emerging markets. We use 2004 as the CGR enforcement year following previous 
empirical studies (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). 7 
2.2. Relevant Provisions of Clause-49 
Apart from an overall improvement in corporate governance, we identify three specific 
provisions in Clause-49 that should affect corporate risk-taking in Indian firms: board 
independence, independence of audit committees, and certification by the CEO or CFO. First, 
Clause-49 mandates greater board independence and requires 50% of the board of directors to be 
independent when the Chairman of the board is the executive director and one-third (33%) to be 
independent when the Chairman is a non-executive. Second, Clause-49 requires an affected firm 
to have an audit committee with a minimum of three directors, two-thirds of which are required to 
be independent, and at least one with experience in financial management. The Clause also requires 
certification by the auditor or company secretary on compliance with corporate governance 
provisions and disclosures, thereby increasing their accountability. Third, Clause-49 mandates 
certifications of the financial statements and internal control mechanisms by the CEO or CFO, and 
expands the personal accountability of the management and insiders on a firm’s decisions. 
Taken together, these three provisions related to structure and accountability of the board, 
the audit committee, and the management team can encourage risk-taking and value-enhancing 
investments by decreasing the utility from private benefits and increasing the utility from the 
wealth effect of risky investments (John et al., 2008). At the same time, these provisions could 
                                                 
7 The legal set-up for Clause-49 is such that enforcement under Section 23E (in 2004) would occur in the first instance 
by the SEBI, with a potential appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (a body formed to deal with securities law 
issues and to address SEBI appeals) and followed by a final appeal to the Supreme Court. Reports suggest that the 
number (turnaround time) of settled cases on enforcement decisions has been increasing (decreasing) in the post-
enforcement period of 2004 on issues enforced by the SEBI and the Securities Appellate Tribunal. Clause-49 
intervention can therefore be argued to have a reasonably clear system of handling cases of non-compliance. 
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also increase the compliance burden, discouraging corporate risk-taking, as documented by 
previous studies (Coles et al., 2008; Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen and Dey, 2013). 
 
2.3. Self-Selection 
One concern related to Clause-49 is whether firms could endogenously self-select to be exposed 
to or remain unaffected by the reform. Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) highlight two scenarios in 
which a firm could endogenously self-select to remain unaffected by the CGR, based on the 
threshold of paid-up equity capital and how these scenarios are less likely in a Clause-49 set-up. 
First, a firm that meets the current criteria of paid-up capital may choose not to comply by lowering 
its paid-up equity capital. However, this strategy is not realistic as the compliance criteria are 
backward-looking, and the firm would have been affected by Clause-49 if it had reached the paid-
up capital or net worth criteria at any point in its history. Second, a firm may have had a lower 
paid-up capital or net worth than the threshold required to comply, and may wish to abstain from 
raising its capital base, that is, enhance its paid-up capital, to remain unaffected. However, if the 
firm is growing in size and earnings significantly, then it is very likely to reach the required net 
worth threshold. This is because net worth is that part of the capital base that is adjusted for retained 
earnings and several reserves, and is therefore less likely to be manipulated. Finally, if any firm is 
below the required threshold, but wishes to be affected by the regulation, it could endogenously 
issue additional equity to reach the paid-up capital threshold. However, Dharmapala and Khanna 
(2013) empirically do not observe any such strategic manipulation in the Indian data. 
 
9 
 
3. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Corporate Risk-Taking and CGR 
Economic theory models the effect of CGR on firm risk-taking as a utility function of an 
insider who derives utility from the wealth effect of investments and private consumption of the 
resources of a firm (John et al., 2008). A higher level of wealth effect from investment is positively 
related to insiders’ appetite for value-enhancing risk-taking behavior. In contrast, a higher level of 
private benefit is negatively related to insiders’ appetite for value-enhancing risk-taking behavior. 
The positive effect of CGR, as elaborated below, on a firm’s risk-taking could stem from different 
channels. 
First, higher utility derived from the investment-related wealth effect could be driven by the 
reduced cost of capital as a result of better corporate governance (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Chen et al., 
2009). There are three key arguments that explain why better corporate governance could lower 
the cost of capital. First, better corporate governance reduces information asymmetry between 
insiders and investors in the capital market through greater disclosure and independent monitoring, 
which subsequently lowers the information-related cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Second, progress in corporate governance improves stock liquidity in the market by 
reducing information asymmetry among traders (Chung et al., 2010). As liquidity is factored into 
the cost of capital estimation (Amihud and Mendelson, 2000; Easley and O'Hara, 2004), improved 
liquidity following CGR could also lower the cost of capital. Third, better investor protection 
attracts foreign investors, who play a crucial role in decreasing the cost of capital through 
international risk-sharing (Errunza and Miller, 2000) and better monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000), and by providing greater market liquidity (Errunza and Miller, 2000). 
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Second, as improved corporate monitoring lowers the magnitude and importance of the 
private benefits of insiders, CGR may discourage investment conservatism through independent 
board monitoring (Weisbach, 1988; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Fauver et al., 2017; Lu and Wang, 
2018). Similarly, harsher sanctions in mandatory CGR provisions increase the disciplinary 
pressure on insiders and may reduce the insiders’ expected private consumption. Taken together, 
an improvement in CGR could therefore increase the utility from the investment-related wealth 
effect and decrease the utility from private benefits, both of which could encourage higher value-
enhancing risk-taking. 
Contrary to this positive prediction, studies also document evidence of the negative 
association between CGR and a firm’s risk-taking behavior (Coles et al., 2008; Bargeron at el., 
2010; Cohen and Dey, 2013). Previous studies suggest that stricter provisions of CGR, which 
assign expanded financial and criminal liabilities, increase risk-aversion and thus discourage 
decision-makers from taking on value-maximizing risky investments (Bargeron at el., 2010). 
Similarly, it is argued that for growing and innovative firms, greater external monitoring may be 
expensive (Coles et al., 2008). As CGR expands the role and number of external directors, this 
increased cost of independent monitoring could further dampen insiders’ risk-taking appetite 
(Coles et al., 2008; Cohen and Dey, 2013). 
Therefore, in hypothesis one (H1), we empirically test the following two conflicting views 
on the role of CGR in corporate risk-taking. 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should increase corporate risk-taking. 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should decrease corporate risk-taking. 
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3.2. CGR, Ownership Concentration, and Risk-taking. 
An emerging market set-up characterized by the prevalence of concentrated ownership 
structures, where few concentrated owners have full control over corporate decisions and 
resources, witnesses a higher conflict of interest between dominant insiders and minority outsiders 
(Stulz, 2005; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). These concentrated owners could opt for lower risk-
taking because of two important reasons. 
First, concentrated insiders would derive higher utility of private benefits because of their 
higher control over corporate resources, which could incentivize them to pursue investment 
conservatism (Bertrand et al., 2002; John et al., 2008; Gul et al., 2010). CGR should reduce the 
expected utility from such private benefits by increasing the likelihood of monitoring and 
prosecuting misappropriation (Aggarwal et al., 2008; John et al., 2008). This reduction in the utility 
of private benefits could thus encourage risk-taking. 
Second, concentrated insiders may choose to avoid risk-taking because of their under-
diversified stake in a firm. For example, Paligorova (2010) finds that, compared to institutional 
counterparts like mutual funds, banks, financial, and industrial companies, concentrated 
individuals and large family shareholders tend to indulge in lower corporate risk-taking, largely 
due to their under-diversified stakes. Similarly, Faccio et al. (2011) note that large undiversified 
shareholders pursue more conservative investment policies. As CGR expands the influence of 
minority shareholders in corporate decision-making, this shift could positively induce the risk-
taking activities of otherwise conservative firms because of concentrated ownership. 
We therefore expect higher risk-taking in firms with higher ownership concentration, when 
compared to their counterparts with lower ownership concentration, following CGR. Accordingly, 
we state the following second hypothesis (H2): 
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H2: Ceteris paribus, enforcement of CGR should increase corporate risk-taking in firms with 
greater ownership concentration. 
 
3.3. CGR and the Value-Implication of Risk-taking 
Existing studies find a positive role of CGR on a firm’s market valuation (Black and Khanna, 
2007; Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013; Fauver et al., 2017). Specifically, Black and Khanna (2007) 
and Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) show that CGR interventions in an emerging market context 
are value-enhancing. However, the channels through which CGR influences firm valuation are less 
clear. 
Related literature also posits that higher corporate risk-taking should increase the market 
valuation of firms (John et al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2011). Aligning this empirical evidence with 
the possibility that CGR could positively affect corporate risk-taking, we argue that corporate risk-
taking could therefore be the channel through which CGR translates into higher firm valuation. In 
other words, the market rewards the positive shift in risk-taking of firms following CGR with a 
higher valuation. Accordingly, our third hypothesis (H3) is as follows: 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, following the enforcement of CGR, firms with higher corporate risk-taking 
should have higher market value. 
 
4. Data 
Our primary source of data is the Prowess database, maintained by the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess provides detailed annual financial data and other firm-specific 
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variables of both listed and unlisted public limited companies.8 For our study, we primarily use all 
non-financial firms available in the database for the sample period of 2000 to 2007 listed in or 
before 2000. For our examination of cross-listed Indian firms, we obtained the relevant data from 
Dharmapala and Khanna (2013).9 Our dataset consists of a sample of 26,584 firm-year 
observations of 3,839 non-financial firms listed on either the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) or 
the National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE) for the period 2000 to 2007 for which there are 
no missing data for at least one of the three proxies used in the analysis.10 A description of the 
variables used in the study is also provided in Appendix 2, and a breakdown of the sample by 
industry is shown in Appendix 3. We use the Prowess database code to identify industries and 
group them into 22 broad industry sectors following Vig (2013). 
 
4.1. Risk-Taking and Corporate Investment Proxies 
Following the literature, we use earnings-volatility as our prime variable to capture corporate 
risk-taking in our empirical testing (John et al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2013). 
As riskier projects exhibit higher volatility, earnings-volatility captures the degree of risk-taking 
in a firm’s operations, based on the volatility of the operating earnings (John et al., 2008; Boubakri 
et al., 2013). We calculate earnings-volatility as the three-year rolling standard deviation of 
earnings, where earnings is measured using earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) expressed as a percentage of total assets. 
To gauge the effect of CGR on fixed and innovative investments, we also use two other 
                                                 
8 The database has been used by a number of studies, including Lilienfeld-Toal et al. (2012), Vig (2013), and Gopalan 
et al. (2016). 
9 We thank Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya Khanna for sharing their data on cross-listed Indian firms before 
the enforcement of Clause-49. We also matched the data on cross-listed Indian firms with those collected from the 
website www.adr.com. 
10 Prowess variables are reported as of March 31, each year. Therefore, we use March-end financial data for a given 
year as previous year-end data. 
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alternative dependent variables: capital expenditure and R&D expenditure. Both of these measures 
of corporate investments are shown to be linked to risk-taking and have been used widely in the 
literature on risk-taking (Bargeron et al, 2010; Belloc, 2013; Koh and Reeb, 2015). Capital 
expenditure captures the size of tangible investments. It is computed as the difference between 
long-term assets for year “t” and year “t-1” scaled by long-term assets for year “t-1.” R&D 
expenditure reflects a firm’s level of innovative investments (Bargeron at el., 2010; Belloc, 2013) 
and is measured as the total monetary value of research and development expenditure scaled by 
total assets.11 
 
4.2. Control Variables 
We use a number of control variables that could also explain the cross-sectional and temporal 
variations of corporate risk-taking. Studies show that the size of a firm can play a key role in the 
ability and appetite of the firm to make investment decisions (Whited and Wu, 2006). We control 
for Size by taking the natural logarithm of total assets where assets are expressed in millions of 
INR. We also account for the capital structure of the firm (Leverage), as investment decisions and 
risk-taking are directly affected by access to finance (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Campello et 
al., 2010). Similarly, creditors can have interests that are different from those of shareholders in 
the risk-taking of a firm, because of their fiduciary stake and their concave payoffs (Acharya et al., 
2011). We measure Leverage as the book value of debt-to-equity ratio. The literature also 
establishes an association between a firm’s operating liquidity (cash holding) and levels of 
corporate risk-taking (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). For example, if firms expect financing 
                                                 
11 Any missing R&D expenditure observations are not treated as zero, as Koh and Reeb (2015) suggest that firms for 
which R&D expenses are missing are significantly different from zero R&D firms. This exclusion significantly 
reduces the number of observations available for regressions with R&D Expenditure. 
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uncertainty, those with higher investment needs can build up liquidity to hedge against a possible 
future credit shock. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities. 
Promoters, as they are the founding members and insiders of a firm, can affect the level of 
corporate risk-taking (John et al., 2008). We control for ownership concentration (OwnCon) as the 
proportion of total shares held by promoters. Finally, risk-taking may also be influenced by the 
growth potential of firms, as argued by the literature on finance and growth (Levine, 2003). The 
growth potential of the firms is proxied by the ratio of market value of equity to its book value, 
Market-to-Book (MB). As corporate risk-taking may differ on the basis of time invariant firm-
specific characteristics, such as gender (Faccio et al., 2016), we control for Firm Fixed Effect in 
our empirical models. Finally, we control for Year Fixed Effect to capture the effect of time-events 
driving our results. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the dependent and control variables for the entire 
sample, as well as for the pre-CGR (2000-2003) and post-CGR periods (2004-2007). It shows a 
statistically significant growth (at the 1% significance level) in firms’ earnings-volatility (5.83% 
to 7.20%), capital expenditure (11.46% to 14.03%), and R&D expenditure (1.25% to 1.68%) in 
the post-CGR period in comparison with the pre-CGR period. Three of the controls (Size, 
Liquidity, and MB) also witnessed a significant increase in the post-CGR period. However, 
Leverage decreased significantly,12 and there was no significant change in OwnCon in the post-
CGR period. These descriptive differences offer some preliminary evidence that the enforcement 
                                                 
12 A decrease in leverage may suggest the creditors’ response to increased risk-taking on part of the firm. Alternatively, 
this may also imply attractiveness of equity financing when compared to debt financing in the post-2004 period. 
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of CGR could have increased the corporate risk-taking behavior of the firms. 
…Insert Table 1 about here… 
5.1.1. Clause-49 Groups 
Our treated group comprises listed Indian firms affected by Clause-49 and control group 
firms unaffected by CGR. By construction, the treated firms are larger than the control firms. We 
address the issue of comparability by generating four different groups, depending on when the 
firms were affected by Clause-49 (based on the paid-up equity capital threshold). Group 1 
comprises the larger Indian firms (listed as flag “A” in BSE), which were required to comply by 
March 31, 2001. Group 2 comprises mid-sized firms with paid-up equity capital of at least INR 
100 million or net worth of INR 250 million at any point since their incorporation. These firms 
were required to comply by March 31, 2002. Group 3 (3A and 3B) comprises small-sized firms 
with paid-up equity capital between INR 30 million and INR 100 million, and were required to 
comply by March 31, 2003. Group 3A consists of firms with paid-up capital ranging between INR 
45 million and INR 100 million, and Group 3B consists of firms with paid-up capital ranging 
between INR 30 million and INR 45 million. Group 4A firms have paid-up equity capital ranging 
between INR 15 million and INR 30 million. Group 4B comprises firms with paid-up equity capital 
less than INR 15 million. Firms in Group 4 (4A and 4B) were not affected by Clause-49. 
We present firm characteristics prior to CGR for all the four different groups in Table 2. The 
discontinuity around the paid-up equity capital threshold separates Group 3 firms (3A and 3B) as 
treated firms, whereas Group 4 firms (4A and 4B), which are the control firms, remain unaffected 
by our CGR. This exogenous separation of firms into treated and control groups by Clause-49 
allows us to employ RD and difference-in-differences (DiD) designs for empirical investigation. 
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…Insert Table 2 about here… 
5.2. Main Results 
The RD approach is able to credibly estimate the causal effect of CGR on the risk-taking of 
treated firms. Further, RD design also overcomes concerns about the alternative effects driven by 
firms that may be far away from the paid-up equity capital threshold at which CGR was applicable. 
Our main results are based on the RD and DiD research designs. 
5.2.1. Regression Discontinuity (RD) Test 
Following Lemieux and Milligan (2008) we conduct a RD test on the cross-section of firms 
for two years of post-CGR period (i.e., 2004-2005), as shown in equation (1). 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) + 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡. 𝜹+𝜗𝑗 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) is a categorical variable taking the value of one for firms with paid-up equity 
capital of equal to or greater than INR 30 million and zero otherwise. 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is earnings-volatility 
as defined in the earlier section (i is indexed as the firm and t as the year). We use two additional 
corporate investment proxies (capital expenditure and R&D expenditure) as additional dependent 
variables. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of key control variables as defined earlier and 𝜗𝑗 is industry fixed effects. 
Our key coefficient of interest, 𝛽, is the discontinuity estimator of the causal effect of CGR on the 
treated firms. The main identification assumption of the RD approach is that 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) is a 
smooth function of paid-up equity capital: that is, 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) controls for any continuous 
impact of paid-up equity capital on a firm’s risk-taking in 2004 and 2005.13 
We report the results from the RD analysis in Table 3. Models (1) to (3) report coefficients 
                                                 
13 In the results reported in Table 3 we assume 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖) to be linear in paid-up equity capital. However, the 
results are consistent with the polynomial functional form for 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝑢𝑝𝑖). 
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for entire sample firms, whereas models (4) to (6) report coefficients only for firms in Groups 3 
and 4, as described above. Table 3 shows that the coefficients on risk-taking and corporate 
investment measures are both positive and significant (at least at the 5% significance level), 
implying a discontinuous increase in risk-taking and corporate investment on the part of treated 
firms in 2004 and 2005. Similarly, compared to the entire sample, the coefficients of the threshold 
dummy for risk-taking and corporate investment proxies are higher in magnitude in sub-sample 
firms (reported in Models 4 to 6), which implies a stronger increase in corporate risk-taking in 
treated firms that are closer to the threshold. This result supports hypothesis 1a and rejects 
hypothesis 1b. 
In terms of control variables, OwnCon is negatively related to all the proxies of risk-taking 
and corporate investments, and is consistently significant (at least at 10%) across different models 
and subsamples. This result is in line with the theoretical prediction that ownership concentration 
encourages a firm to pursue investment conservatism. Size seems to affect earnings-volatility and 
R&D expenditure negatively, and capital expenditure positively. Similarly, MB is significant and 
positively associated (at the 1% significance level) with risk-taking and corporate investment 
measures, implying the value relevance of risk-taking. Coefficients of Leverage and Liquidity also 
have the expected signs, even though they are not consistently significant across the models. 
 
…Insert Table 3 about here… 
5.2.2. Propensity Score Matched Difference-in-Differences (PSM-DiD) Regression 
Although the RD regression of the cross-section of firms around the threshold of paid-up 
equity capital provides evidence of the positive effect of CGR on firm risk-taking, there are other 
factors besides paid-up equity capital that may affect corporate risk-taking. We therefore apply 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to the firms around the threshold of paid-up equity capital to 
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generate the most comparable treated and control firms and run a PSM-DiD regression for this 
subset of firms14 in Group 3 (treated firms) and Group 4 (control firms). 
…Insert Table 4 about here… 
In applying PSM, we first estimate a probit model using firms in Groups 3 and 4. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the firm belongs to Group 3 and zero if it belongs to Group 
4. The probit model includes all control variables from equation (2). We use propensity scores 
estimated from Model (1) of Panel A in Table 4 to perform matching between treated and control 
firms, using the closest propensity score, following Smith and Todd (2005). This generates 171 
pairs of matched firms from Groups 3 and 4. To examine whether treated and control firms 
generated from the PSM technique reduce the possible observable differences among treated and 
control groups prior to CGR enforcement, we further run the probit model with the matched sub-
sample alone as a diagnostic test. As shown in Model (2) of Panel A in Table 4, no independent 
variables are significant in explaining the assignment of these matched firms into treated and 
control groups. In addition, the pseudo 𝑅2 decreases sharply from 0.113, prior to the matching, to 
0.023, following the PSM, thereby reducing the explanatory power of the model with the matched 
firms. This diagnostic test in Model 2 indicates that matching reduces possible observable 
differences among treated and control groups prior to CGR enforcement. 
 To assess the pre-CGR and post-CGR trends in risk-taking of the matched treated and 
control group within groups 3 and 4, we present the time series of yearly average figures of 
earnings-volatility of these comparable firms for the period between 2000 and 2007 in Figure 2.  
…Insert Figure 2 about here… 
                                                 
14 Additionally, we run DiD regression from two highly comparable treated (Group 3B) and control (Group 4A) firms 
from Table 2 clustered around the cut-off of paid-up capital of INR 30 million, and that are generally similar in terms 
of size and other firm characteristics and find that significantly positive DiD estimates are in line with hypothesis 1a. 
These results can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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We see in Figure 2 that the control firms do not show a significant change in the trend 
following the 2004 CGR. Further, the visual impression of Figure 2 shows that both the treated 
and control groups do not have significant differences in their pre-CGR trends. However, 
following CGR, the treated firms show a significant increase in risk-taking, in line with hypothesis 
1a. 
For estimating the causal effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking in the sample of these 
matched treated and control firms, we run the following regression specification (2): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 
𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable as defined in the earlier section (i is indexed as the firm 
and t as the year). 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for treated firms 
and zero for control firms. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) in Equation (2) is a categorical variable that takes the value 
of one for the post-CGR period and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of key control variables as 
defined earlier. 𝛾𝑖 is the firm fixed effect and 𝜏𝑡 is the time fixed effect. DiD coefficient, 𝛽, is the 
coefficient of interaction term 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1), and measures the causal effect of CGR on 
the treated firms.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we report the PSM-DiD regression results. It shows that the DiD 
coefficients of risk-taking and corporate investment proxies for these matched firms are 
significantly positive (at the 1% significance level). We also present the univariate mean DiD 
estimates of PSM firms for all risk-taking and corporate investment measures in Panel C, and find 
positive and significant univariate DiD estimates that are consistent with the results in Panel B. 
The results in Table 4 support hypothesis 1a further, and reject hypothesis 1b. 
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5.3. The Effect of the Introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 on Corporate Risk-taking 
Our empirical investigation so far has followed prior literature and we use the 2004 
expansion of personal liabilities in CGR as the enforcement year. In this section, we examine 
whether the initial introduction of Clause-49 in 2000 has an effect on corporate risk-taking. To do 
so, we run a DiD panel regression, as in equation (2). However, the 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) of equation (2) in 
this case takes the value of one for years from 2000 to 2002 and zero for years from 1997 to 1999. 
Control and treated firms are all non-financial, domestically listed firms, as defined in the notes to 
Table 2. Control variables include all except OwnCon, as defined in the notes to Table 1. OwnCon 
does not appear as a control variable, as data on OwnCon are available only for 2001. Table 5 
reports the findings for the proxies of risk-taking and corporate investments. We find that the 
introduction of CGR in 2000 does not have a significant effect on risk-taking of treated firms.15 
…Insert Table 5 about here… 
Why do we fail to see any change in corporate risk-taking after the introduction of Clause-
49? It is important to note that the initial penalty for non-compliance was delisting. Delisting is 
considered to be a significant sanction to deter non-compliance of regulatory provisions, as it 
affects, among others, a firm’s access to and cost of external capital (Stulz, 1999; Brav, 2009). To 
examine this surprising finding further, we hand-collected data on delisting from 2000 to 2007. 
Our data show that 1,245 firms were delisted between 2000 and 2007, of which only 20 firms were 
delisted on the ground of non-compliance with regulations. Only 12 firms were delisted for non-
                                                 
15 As Clause-49 is a phased-in reform affecting different treated groups in different times, in addition to investigating 
the introduction effect, as shown in Table 5, in an unreported table, we also examine the DiD regression using equation 
(2). We redefine 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1) as a categorical variable which takes the value of one if a firm is affected by Clause-
49 in a year and zero otherwise, and an event indicator variable, 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) which takes the value of one for three years 
following the applicability of clause-49 until 2003 and zero otherwise. The results are consistent, with no significant 
introduction effect as presented in Table 5. 
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compliance with SEBI regulations not related to Clause-49, with no firm delisted on the ground of 
violating Clause-49. On the basis of this evidence, we argue that, in the absence of any actual 
delisting, the threat of being delisted as a penalty might not be robust enough to induce the expected 
changes in corporate behavior, particularly in the context of emerging markets (Dutcher, 2005; 
Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013).16 
The use of robust penalties to induce changes in corporate behavior is also supported by 
existing studies that highlight the importance of stronger sanctions for non-compliance (Dutcher, 
2005).17 For example, Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) in their investigation of CGR in India note 
that the prospect of public enforcement actions, in the form of expanded financial sanctions and 
criminal liabilities for non-compliance, may act as a strong stimulus to deter insiders from 
diverting corporate resources for their personal benefit.18 They also argue that in the absence of 
stricter enforcement provisions, even firms that are willing to adopt, or have already adopted, better 
corporate governance practices could incur significant costs to convince outside investors credibly. 
Further, the addition of more severe sanctions is a strong signal of greater reputational penalties. 
Consistent with the argument that sanctions need to be adequate to induce expected changes in 
corporate behavior (Dutcher, 2005), our findings highlight the importance of stricter CGR 
                                                 
16 Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) state that on average effective enforcement in advanced economies is twice as high 
as in emerging and transition economies. 
17 Becker’s (1968) economic model notes that maximizing punishments for non-compliance, particularly monetary 
fines, may encourage expected enforcement. 
18 However, there is now some evidence that SEBI is imposing sanctions for non-compliance. For example, 
www.livemint.com notes the following for the year ending December 31, 2013: “As part of the initial action, the two 
exchanges (BSE and NSE) have imposed penalties and suspended trading in companies’ shares mostly for non-
compliance with clauses 35 and 49. BSE has imposed a total fine of Rs. 2.56 crores on companies breaching clause 
35, and a fine of Rs. 44.54 crores for non-compliance with Clause-49. NSE has imposed a total fine of Rs. 9.34 lakhs 
on 32 firms. This fine amount will keep increasing since it is imposed on a per-day basis.” [Source 
(https://www.livemint.com/Money/BnUE7CAEJ5TUi6RApPwO6M/BSE-NSE-find-widespread-violation-of-
listing-norms.html) accessed 4 June 2018, 18.23 BST] 
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sanctions in stimulating corporate risk-taking.19 
 
5.4. Robustness Checks for Hypothesis 1. 
Although we control for various firm-level characteristics, and firm and year fixed effects, 
in our examination of hypotheses 1a and 1b, there could be other differences in our treated and 
control groups that could have an impact on corporate risk-taking. Alternatively, our results could 
capture other contemporaneous shocks. We address these alternative explanations through a series 
of robustness checks in the following sub-sections, which strengthen the causality claim of the 
positive effect of CGR on corporate risk-taking further. 
 
5.4.1. Addressing Pre-CGR Corporate Governance Differences among Firms 
It is possible that some of the firms within the treated group could be those that were exposed 
to a higher level of governance standards before CGR in 2004. Hence, their inclusion in our sample 
as treated firms, could lead to a bias in our results. We deal with this issue by identifying 84 firms 
within the treated group that are cross-listed in international exchanges as at or before 2004 and 
employ them as our alternative control group. Existing studies suggest that internationally cross-
listed firms, particularly of emerging markets, exhibit superior corporate governance when 
compared to their domestic counterparts since the cross-listed firms need to comply with the higher 
CGR requirement of the developed market listing agreement (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002; Karolyi, 
                                                 
19 To reduce the possibility that industry-specific shocks like changes in investment opportunities and/ or competition 
across different industries could confound our results, we interact with the industry dummy, which takes a unique 
value for each industry, as defined in Appendix 3, with the year dummies and run DiD regression with firm fixed 
effect and the interaction of industry and year. The results, which are unreported but can be obtained from the authors, 
are robust when we control for this effect in our model lending support to hypothesis 1a. 
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2012).20 Therefore, we maintain that the effect of domestic CGR intervention should have a 
smaller effect on the corporate governance practices of cross-listed Indian firms, relative to firms 
listed domestically alone. 
One potential concern regarding the comparability of cross-listed firms with the entire 
sample of domestically listed treated firms is that these firms, on average, are of larger size when 
compared to overall treated firms. To address this, we generate a size-decile of all treated firms 
(excluding the cross-listed firms) based on average size (natural logarithm of book value of total 
assets in millions of INR) before 2004, and assign size-matched treated firms to firms falling in 
the uppermost size-decile (average size of 8.85 versus 8.86 of cross-listed firms prior to 2004 
CGR). We repeat the PSM as described in Section 5.2.2 from this size-matched universe of treated 
firms and obtain 81 pairs of propensity score matched treated firms and cross-listed firms as an 
alternative control group. 
Table 6 reports PSM-DiD regressions of these size-matched treated firms.21 In line with our 
main findings in Tables 3 and 4, the DiD coefficients of these matched groups, as reported in Panel 
B of Table 6, are positive and significant (at the 1% significance level). The results from univariate 
DiD estimates in Panel C are also consistent with our main results. Thus, the use of cross-listed 
firms as an alternative control group reduces the possibility of our results supporting hypothesis 
1a. They are driven by pre-CGR corporate governance differences among treated firms. 
                                                 
20 The superiority of corporate governance of cross-listed firms is explained by the bonding argument. The argument 
contends that the prevalence of potential agency conflicts in firms in emerging economies, in large part, is a result of 
fragile regulatory oversight, inadequate transparency, and disclosure requirements, as well as weak legal protection of 
minority investors. To overcome these deficiencies in governance, firms in developing markets choose to bond 
themselves credibly with the legal and financial institutions of developed markets by means of international cross-
listing (Stulz, 1999; Coffee, 2002; Karolyi, 2012). 
21 The dependent variable of the probit model in Panel A in Table 6 is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 
if a firm is cross-listed in or before 2004, and zero if it is a Clause-49 affected firm in the uppermost size decile before 
2004, and not cross-listed. The covariates for propensity score estimation in column 1 of Panel A are the same as in 
equation (2). 
25 
 
…Insert Table 6 about here… 
5.4.2. Placebo Test 
Our main tests rely on the premise that there is no notable economy-wide shock in 2004, 
other than the enforcement of Clause-49, as an explanation of the systematic changes observed in 
corporate risk-taking. From our examination of the political economy of India through media 
coverage and previous empirical studies, we find no such economy-wide shock in 2004. However, 
it could be that our results are simply reflecting the effect of confounding shocks before or after 
the 2004 intervention or continuation of pre-existing trend. To address this, we use a placebo test. 
We design two pseudo-shock periods, one for 2002 (two years before the enforcement shock) and 
the other for 2006 (two years after the enforcement shock). Our treated and control groups remain 
the same as determined by Clause-49. We re-run regression equation (2), this time altering the 
dummy variable 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) to 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) which takes the value of one for years 2002 and 2003 
for False-Experiment 1 (FSY=2002) and zero for two years before 2002. Similarly, for False-
Experiment 2 (FSY=2006), 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is one for the years 2006 and 2007 and zero for two 
years before 2006. 
Table 7 reports the DiD regression results from these false experiments. The estimates of 
risk-taking and corporate investment proxies show an insignificant effect for both 2002 and 2006, 
suggesting that confounding events around CGR are not driving our results.22 
…Insert Table 7 about here… 
 
 
                                                 
22 In an unreported Table, with 2003 (one year before true experiment year) as the false experiment year, we find the 
results to be consistent with Table 7. However, the placebo test, with 2005 as the false experiment year, shows a 
significant positive effect, which is consistent with the expectation that the effect of the CGR on risk-taking is 
persistent for 2005. 
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5.5. Channels through which CGR Affects Risk-taking. 
 In the discussion of possible channels through which CGR could affect risk-taking in Section 
3.1, we contend that a firm’s risk-taking is related positively to insiders’ utility from the wealth 
effect of investments and negatively to insiders’ utility from private benefits. In this section we 
examine changes in the magnitude of the key channels in the post-CGR period compared to their 
pre-CGR values. We maintain that changes in these metrics following the CGR could encourage 
corporate risk-taking. 
5.5.1. Cost of Equity Capital 
As discussed in Section 3.1, we explore whether cost of equity capital has reduced 
significantly in the post-2004 period, which could lead to higher positive net present value (NPV) 
investments. We examine the dividend yield of our sample firms as a proxy of cost of equity capital 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006). We compute the 
dividend yield as a ratio of dividend paid per share to the market price per share of a firm’s common 
stock. Table 8 shows a 0.35 percentage points decrease (significant at the 1% significance level) 
in the dividend yield of treated firms, whereas the change in the dividend yield of control firms is 
not significant. This reduction in the cost of equity capital following CGR in 2004 could have 
encouraged corporate risk-taking. 
…Insert Table 8 about here… 
5.5.2. Liquidity 
We explore whether a decrease in cost of capital is associated with improvement in stock 
liquidity. To do so, we examine the changes in liquidity measures for the treated and control groups 
following the 2004 reform in Clause-49. We use two widely used measures of liquidity. First, we 
use the Amihud (2002) Illiquidity Ratio (ILR) as measured by the annual average ratio of absolute 
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daily return to the daily trading volume. The second illiquidity measure that we use is the number 
of days with zero returns (DZR) as a proportion of total trading days in a year (Bekaert et al., 
2007).23 Table 8 shows that the Amihud ILR of treated firms decreases sharply by 0.186 units 
(significant at the 1% significance level) in comparison to a slight (0.088 units) decrease in control 
firms. Similarly, the DZR of treated firms decreases by 6.17 percentage points (significant at the 
1% significance level) in comparison with an increase of 1.69 percentage points for the control 
groups. Overall, both illiquidity measures show a significant decrease for treated firms post-CGR 
when compared to those of control firms (significant negative DiD estimates at the 1% significance 
level). The improvement in (lowering of) liquidity (illiquidity) could encourage investment in 
positive NPV projects through a reduced cost of capital. 
 
5.5.3 Foreign Ownership 
The increased presence of foreign investors can reduce the cost of capital through higher 
monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and international risk-sharing (Errunza and Miller, 2000). 
To examine the changes in the ownership of foreign investors in our sample, we compute foreign 
equity ownership of the treated and control firms before and after CGR. We measure foreign equity 
ownership as a ratio of the number of shares held by foreign non-promoter shareholders to the total 
number of shares held by all non-promoters. Table 8 shows that treated firms witness an average 
increase of 6.12 percentage points in foreign ownership (significant at the 1% significance level) 
in comparison with the insignificant increase of 0.31 percentage points for control firms. The 
univariate DiD estimate is a positive 5.81 percentage points and statistically significant at the 1% 
                                                 
23 ILR enables a relationship between the changes in stock price and trading volume. A lower ILR implies higher 
market liquidity. Zero returns occur when the cost of transactions becomes greater than the value of information for 
the informed trader, therefore reflecting concerns of the liquidity in informed trades on returns of securities (Lesmond, 
2005; Bekaert et al., 2007). Further, greater transaction costs lead to a higher number of zero returns. 
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level. Increased foreign investors following CGR of 2004 could reduce the cost of capital and 
improve monitoring, both of which can encourage value-enhancing risk-taking. 
5.5.4. Board Independence 
Studies note that independent directors are often valued for working in favor of shareholders 
by disciplining managers (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Board independence could positively affect 
value-enhancing corporate risk-taking in firms where insiders or managers are more likely to be 
risk-averse in pursuing more conservative investments (Lu and Wang, 2018). Similarly, 
independent boards are important for yielding innovative outcomes (Sena et al., 2018). The value-
enhancing effect of independent directors increases when CGR mandates crucial roles for them, 
such as sitting on audit committees (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010). Board independence can be an 
important channel in encouraging investment in wealth-creating risky projects, as better 
monitoring and accountability can reduce private consumption (Johnson et al., 2000; John et al., 
2008; Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). To assess this channel, we calculate an Independent Board 
metric as a ratio of the number of independent board members to the total number of board 
members. As expected, and implied by the provisions of Clause-49, Table 8 shows that the 
Independent Board of treated firms increases by 7.71 percentage points in the post-CGR period 
when compared to a relatively smaller increase (2.17 percentage points) of independent boards of 
the control firms in the same period. 
To sum up, our examination of the potential channels through which CGR can impact risk-
taking and corporate investments shows that, following CGR, treated firms experience lower cost 
of capital, potentially resulting from higher liquidity, a higher presence of foreign investors, and 
better scrutiny of corporate decisions through a greater degree of board independence. Similarly, 
an increase in independent monitoring by an independent board and foreign owners can help 
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reduce the utility from expected private benefits, thereby encouraging value-maximizing risk-
taking and corporate investments. Taken together, the shift in these factors is likely to encourage 
corporate risk-taking of treated firms in post-CGR period, in line with hypothesis 1a. 
 
5.6. Ownership Concentration and the Role of CGR 
In this section, we examine hypothesis 2 by using the difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DiDiD) estimation as shown in equation (3): 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜔. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜒. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
+ 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
where 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the two-year average of promoters’ shareholding before the enforcement 
of Clause-49. The coefficient 𝜔 estimates the impact of CGR on the cross-section of treated firms 
based on the heterogeneity of their ownership concentration prior to CGR. For CGR to stimulate 
positive corporate risk-taking among firms with higher ownership concentration, 𝜔 of Equation 
(3) should be positive. 
To examine hypothesis 2, we proxy ownership concentration as the percentage of shares 
owned by promoting shareholders. We calculate the two-year average of promoters’ shareholding 
before the enforcement of Clause-49 to generate heterogeneity in ownership structure prior to 
Clause-49 enforcement and make the variable interact with 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) to obtain the 
triple interaction term: DiDiD-OwnCon= 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  as shown in 
Equation (3). 
Table 9 reports the DiDiD-OwnCon coefficients without and with controls. Without controls 
(Model 1), the coefficients of DiDiD-OwnCon for earnings-volatility, capital expenditure, and 
R&D expenditure of treated firms show significant positive values of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.01 
30 
 
percentage points respectively (significant at the 1% level). The results are consistent when we 
include all the controls in Model 2 for all three proxies of risk-taking and corporate investments. 
Overall, the results suggest that in comparison with the treated peers with lower ownership 
concentration, corporate risk-taking of treated firms with higher ownership concentration has 
significantly increased, following the enforcement of CGR, supporting hypothesis 2. This is 
consistent with the argument that improvements in corporate governance enable firms, which are 
otherwise conservative because of insiders’ dominance, to make more value-enhancing risky 
investment decisions (Stulz, 2005; John et al., 2008; Paligorova, 2010; Boubakri et al., 2013). 
…Insert Table 9 about here… 
 
5.7. CGR, Risk-Taking, and Firm Value 
In hypothesis 3 we argue that risk-taking could be an important channel through which the 
enforcement of CGR provides higher firm valuation. To test this conjecture, we investigate 
whether an increase in corporate risk-taking and corporate investments following CGR is 
associated with higher firm valuation. To do so, we use a panel regression with firm value as the 
explanatory variable, as presented in equation (4): 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1).𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
+ 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)
+ 𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
 
where we proxy firm value using Tobin’s Q, computed as the ratio of the sum of total liabilities, 
book value of preferred stock, and market value of equity to the book value of total assets. We use 
book value, rather than the market value of preferred stock, because preference shares are traded 
very thinly in the Indian market during the study period. All control variables, except MB, remain 
as specified in equation (2). 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) . 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
31 
 
is an interaction term where Risk-taking (corporate investments) is gauged by earnings-volatility 
(capital expenditure and R&D expenditure), and 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) and 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) are as defined in 
equation (2).  
We report the results of the estimation in Table 10. Models 1 to 6 report the results of 
equation (4) without and with controls for each instance of risk-taking and corporate investment 
proxies as well. The results in Models 1 and 2 show that the firm value of higher risk-taking treated 
firms is significantly greater (at the 1% level) than that of lower risk-taking firms (minimum value 
of 0.04 in Model 1). In terms of economic magnitude, this implies a one standard deviation increase 
in a firm’s risk-taking, as proxied by earnings-volatility, is associated with a minimum of 0.274 
units increase in the Tobin’s Q of treated firms (with an average standard deviation of earnings-
volatility of 6.85 percentage points).24 The value relevance proposition also holds for capital 
expenditure (Models 3 and 4) and R&D expenditure (Models 5 and 6). 
 
…Insert Table 10 about here… 
 
There could be a possibility that the risk-taking and corporate investment proxies could 
overlap in terms of information content. In order to assess whether these measures contribute to 
higher firm valuation separately, as reported in Table 10, we run a horse-race procedure by 
including the triple interaction terms of these risk-taking and corporate investment measures 
together in a single model. Model 7 reports the interaction terms of earnings-volatility and capital 
expenditure together, and Model 8 uses triple interaction terms of all three proxies of risk-taking 
and corporate investments. We report Models 7 and 8 separately as the incorporation of the triple 
interaction with R&D expenditure in Model 8 significantly reduces the number of observations. 
                                                 
24 With standard deviation of earnings-volatility at 6.85 percentage points, the coefficient of 0.04 translates to 0.274 
units (=0.04*6.85). 
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Models 7 and 8 show that each of the three proxies of risk-taking and corporate investments is 
individually significant at the 1% level and contributes to higher firm valuation in the post-CGR 
period. 
Finally, in Model 9 of Table 10, we replicate the evidence of Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) 
and find that firm valuation has increased in an economically meaningful magnitude in the post-
CGR period. Our findings are consistent with those of Dharmapala and Khanna (2013). However, 
when compared to Model 8 (and Model 7) where we control for the contribution from risk-taking 
and corporate investments, the economic magnitude of the DiD coefficient reduces both in 
magnitude (from 0.89 to 0.38) and statistical significance, suggesting that a significant portion of 
value derived by the treated firms after the CGR is associated with higher risk-taking by these 
firms. These results further support our view that corporate risk-taking is an important channel 
through which CGR affects a firm’s value, supporting hypothesis 3. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The debate on the effect of CGR on corporate investment decisions is a matter of concern 
for policy-makers. The literature provides two different theoretical perspectives on the effect of 
CGR on a firm’s corporate risk-taking. One argument is that stricter CGR sanctions, which expand 
the financial and personal liability of corporate insiders for corporate affairs, increase the 
compliance burden and discourage insiders from undertaking value-enhancing risky investment 
decisions. On the other hand, expected utility from private benefits of the dominant insiders could 
favor investment conservatism to the extent of passing up positive NPV risky investments. CGR 
limits expected private benefits of the insiders through independent scrutiny and transparency, 
thereby encouraging these insiders to pursue value-enhancing risk-taking. The possibility of either 
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of the two opposing economic predictions motivates us to empirically examine the effect of CGR 
intervention in an emerging market set-up where weaker market forces of corporate scrutiny make 
mandatory CGR an important policy tool to improve corporate governance practices. 
Employing a major CGR in India, our main result, supported by a series of robustness 
checks, provides strong evidence in support of the argument that stricter CGR intervention 
increases corporate risk-taking. We argue that, contrary to recent evidence around SOX, stricter 
CGR in a set-up facing a weaker investor protection regime and the prevalence of dominant 
insiders could reduce the private benefits of dominant insiders, thereby expanding a firm’s appetite 
for risk-taking. 
Our results, which are driven by increased risk-taking among firms with higher ownership 
concentration, suggest that CGR increases the risk-taking of otherwise investment conservative 
firms. Our results also indicate that risk-taking is an important channel through which CGR 
harnesses higher valuation for firms. These findings imply that in a set-up with a weaker market 
mechanism of corporate governance, CGR substitutes weaker market forces of corporate scrutiny 
to stimulate value-enhancing risk-taking and corporate investments. This evidence supports the 
view that stricter corporate governance interventions can bring about positive investment outcomes 
in the evolving regulatory environment of emerging markets. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the average of variables (along with their standard deviation presented in the second row and number 
of observations presented in the third row for each variable) used in the analysis for the entire study period and also 
segregated into two periods, i.e. before Clause-49 enforcement (2000-2003) and after Clause-49 (2004-2007). 
Earnings-volatility is defined as a three-year rolling standard deviation of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets. Capital expenditure is the change in long-term assets scaled by 
previous year total long-term assets. R&D expenditure is computed as a fraction of total assets. The measures of risk-
taking and corporate investments are expressed in percentages. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets expressed 
in millions of Indian currency (INR). Leverage is the ratio of book value of debt to book value of equity. Liquidity 
is the book liquidity obtained by dividing liquid assets by current liabilities. OwnCon is the ownership concentration 
variable computed as shares owned by promoting shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding. MB 
represents the ratio of the market value of shareholders’ equity to its book value. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 
2007. Source: CMIE database. 
 
Variables 
Overall 
[1] 
Pre-Clause-49 
[2] 
Post-Clause-49 
[3] 
Difference 
[3-2] 
earnings-volatility 6.54 5.83  7.20  1.37*** 
 (5.78) (5.60) (5.92) 
 26336 12630 13706 
capital expenditure 12.80  11.46  14.03  2.57*** 
 (11.20) (10.21) (11.92) 
 26584 12763 13821 
R&D expenditure 1.47  1.25  1.68  0.43*** 
 (1.58) (1.43) (1.71) 
 5988  2974 3014 
Size 6.10  5.96  6.23  0.27*** 
 (1.86) (1.77) (1.95) 
 26584 12763 13821 
Leverage 1.37  1.46  1.28  -0.18*** 
 (1.73) (1.91) (1.54) 
 19560 9762 9794 
Liquidity 2.83  2.81 2.84 0.03** 
 (5.52) (5.12) (5.90) 
 22858 11339 11519 
OwnCon 49.09  49.08  49.09  0.01 
 (19.98) (19.62) (22.07) 
 16372 6929 9443 
MB 1.41 1.02  1.77  0.75*** 
 (2.54) (2.05) (2.81) 
 25842 12257 13585 
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Table 2 
Firm Characteristics of Groups Exogenously Determined by Clause-49 before 2004 Enforcement 
Table 2 reports the average values of variables used in this study along with their standard deviations (in parentheses) and firm-year observations 
respectively of firms classified into five different groups based on the applicability of Clause-49 and size. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 
1. Groups 1 to 3 firms are subject to Clause-49, as explained in the text. Group 1 firms are large-cap companies listed as the flag "A" category on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. (BSE). Group 2 firms are mid-cap companies that have paid-up capital greater than INR 100 million or net worth 
greater than or equal to INR 250 million. Group 3 firms are low-cap firms that have paid-up capital between INR 100 million and 30 million. We 
classify 3A firms with paid-up capital between 100 million and 45 million and 3B firms with paid-up capital between 45 million and 30 million. 
Groups 4 comprise control firms. Group 4A firms have paid-up capital between INR 15 million and 30 million. Group 4B firms have paid-up capital 
less than INR 15 million. The last column reports summary statistics for cross-listed firms. The sample period is from 2000 to 2003. Source CMIE. 
Variables 
Mean (SD), no. of observations 
Treated groups Control Groups 
Alt. Control 
Group 
Group 1 Group 2 
Group 3 Group 4 Cross-listed 
Firms Group 3A Group 3B Group 4 A Group 4B 
earnings-volatility 3.13 5.34 6.06 6.82 6.84 6.82 3.55 
(2.79) (4.40) (5.32) (4.90) (4.90) (4.18) (3.49) 
605 4729 2868 2542 918 642 326 
capital expenditure 16.49 10.87 11.28 11.41 9.97 12.87 14.16 
(12.44) (10.57) (10.18) (10.23) (10.71) (9.37) (12.46) 
607 4779 2881 2602 924 624 328 
R&D expenditure 1.98 1.02 1.26 1.41 1.52 1.48 1.03 
(2.85) (1.74) (2.41) (2.35) (1.54) (1.42) (2.20) 
344 1102 483 302 286 261 208 
Size 8.84 7.01 5.07 4.85 4.85 3.90 8.86 
(1.52) (1.16) (0.85) (0.97) (0.98) (1.32) (1.44) 
607 4779 2881 2602 924 624 328 
Leverage 1.11 1.70 1.52 1.19 1.20 1.26 1.10 
(2.22) (3.08) (3.38) (2.43) (2.50) (2.76) (1.11) 
599 3856 2133 1795 464 589 326 
Liquidity 2.66 3.30 2.62 2.33 2.34 2.50 2.47 
(6.76) (9.37) (3.41) (1.94) (6.92) (3.65) (1.93) 
 
OwnCon 
605 4444 2189 2408 556 637 326 
56.37 51.63 43.34 46.98 48.87 54.90 38.72 
(18.33) (18.92) (17.85) (19.34) (19.89) (25.18) (16.81) 
569 2780 1222 1378 290 364 326 
MB 2.28 0.91 0.81 0.97 0.98 1.11 2.26 
(3.36) (1.80) (1.93) (2.70) (2.09) (1.61) (6.49) 
597 4617 2691 2511 907 608 326 
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Table 3 
Regression Discontinuity Around Paid-up Equity Capital Threshold  
Table 3 reports the results of different specifications of the following regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) + 𝛿(𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑖  ) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝜗𝑗 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate investment:  capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. 1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with 
paid-up equity capital of INR 30 million or more and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm-level control variables. Firm level controls include size, leverage 
liquidity, ownership concentration (OwnCon) and market-to-book (MB). 𝜗𝑗 controls for industry fixed effects. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Heteroscedasticity robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. The sample period ranges 
from year 2004 to 2005. Source: CMIE database. 
 With entire Sample Firms With Group 3 (treated) and Group 4 (control) 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
Clause-49 0.73** 2.27** 1.05*** 0.84** 2.64** 1.66*** 
 (2.34) (2.23) (2.94) (2.43) (2.52) (2.73) 
       
Size -0.88*** 1.31*** -0.50*** -1.61*** 2.60*** -0.89** 
 (-12.87) (4.35) (-2.86) (-7.85) (11.48) (-2.51) 
       
Leverage -0.03 0.78*** -0.12*** -0.23*** 1.53*** -0.01 
 (-0.71) (4.26) (-6.58) (2.91) (4.01) (-0.06) 
       
Liquidity -0.02 -0.03 -0.07* -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 
 (-1.28) (-0.57) (-1.77) (-0.29) (-1.17) (-1.54) 
       
OwnCon -0.02*** -0.05* -0.02*** -0.02* -0.17*** -0.03*** 
 (-3.48) (-1.79) (-2.88) (-1.78) (-3.92) (-3.39) 
       
MB 0.43*** 2.02*** 0.37*** 0.54*** 3.20*** 1.55*** 
 (7.87) (6.81) (3.64) (4.78) (5.52) (3.03) 
       
Constant 10.09*** 5.74** 4.89*** 8.83*** 4.30** 6.97*** 
 (7.60) (2.24) (3.79) (3.17) (2.16) (2.86) 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3359 3353 1083 1416 1401 228 
Adj. R2 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.27 
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Table 4 
Propensity Score Matched-DiD Regression Around Paid-up Equity Capital Threshold 
Table 4 reports the results of DiD regression of a subsample of treated and control firms based on Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) prior to CGR enforcement. Panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit 
model used to estimate propensity scores for firms in the treated and control groups pre-CGR. The dependent 
variable is one if the firm belongs to Group 3 (treated group) and zero if it belongs to Group 4 (control group) 
separated by the cut-off of equity capital of INR 30 million, as reported in Table 2. Model 1 of Panel A reports 
parameter estimates with the entire sample of Groups 3 and 4, whereas Model 2 reports those for the 
propensity score matched subsample. Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Industry fixed effects are included in both Models in Panel A. Panel B presents DiD regression for matched 
firms as given by equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the 
notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 171 matched treated 
firms and zero for 171 matched control firms from Groups 3 and 4 of Table 4 respectively based on pre-CGR 
PSM. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and 
zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership 
concentration (OwnCon) and market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 control for the fixed effects of firm and year 
respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the error term. Models [1] and [2] report regression without and with controls. Variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% for regression in Panel B. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and 
year levels following Petersen (2009). Panel C presents univariate DiD estimates of the matched treated and 
control groups. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 2007. Source: CMIE database. 
Panel A: Pre-match Propensity Score Regression and Post-match Diagnostic Regression 
 Dummy = 1 if in Group 3 of Treated Firms;  
0 if in Control Firms. 
 Pre-match Post-match 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] 
Size 0.30** 0.09 
 (2.07) (1.29) 
   
Leverage 0.06** 0.01 
 (2.61) (0.34) 
   
Liquidity 0.02* 0.01 
 (1.96) (0.89) 
   
OwnCon -0.00** -0.00 
 (-2.27) (-0.72) 
   
MB 0.12** 0.10 
 (2.21) (1.30) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
   
Intercept 0.62*** 0.52** 
 (5.27) (2.12) 
Observations 3952 1368 
p-value of 𝜒2 0.00 0.48 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.023 
Table 4 continued… 
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Table 4 continued… 
Panel B: DiD Regression of treated and control firms based on pre-CGR PSM 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
DiD 1.13*** 1.23*** 14.59*** 9.52*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 
 (3.23) (3.82) (6.28) (3.10) (2.92) (3.37) 
       
Size  -0.12 
(-0.37) 
 2.20 
(1.45) 
 -0.22 
(-1.56) 
       
Leverage  0.06  1.33  0.10 
  (0.56)  (1.09)  (0.78) 
       
Liquidity  -0.00  -0.00  -0.16 
  (-0.05)  (-0.00)  (-1.42) 
       
OwnCon  -0.02  -0.01  -0.00 
  (-1.17)  (-0.14)  (-0.39) 
       
MB  0.12*  4.83***  0.09* 
  (2.09)  (4.55)  (2.04) 
       
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 (within) 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 
No. of Firms 342 342 342 342 190 190 
No. of Obs. 2736 2589 2736 2697 602 602 
 
Panel C: Univariate DiD estimator of earnings-volatility, capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
 Mean Treated Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean Control Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean DiD Estimator 
(Treated-Control) 
earnings-volatility 0.57 0.05 0.52*** 
 (4.04) (0.15) (3.21) 
    
capital expenditure 3.56 0.83 2.73*** 
 (3.47) (0.35) (3.02) 
    
R&D expenditure 1.99 -0.02 2.01*** 
 (3.29) (-0.08) (3.21) 
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Table 5 
The Effect of Introduction of CGR in 2000 on Corporate Risk-taking 
Table 5 reports the results from different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate investment:  capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 1.  1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
treated firms and zero otherwise. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is a categorical variable that takes the value of one for three years following and including the year of 
introduction of Clause-49, i.e. year 2000 and zero for three years before 2000. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity 
and market-to-book (MB).  𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: CMIE database. 
 
earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] 
(Intro=2000) (Intro=2000) (Intro=2000) 
DiD 0.19 0.91 0.05 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)] (1.08) (1.51) (1.57) 
    Size -0.31** 2.13*** -0.48*** 
 (-2.63) (3.12) (-4.81) 
    Leverage -0.13** 0.25** -0.01 
 (-2.27) (2.35) (-0.20) 
    Liquidity 0.01 -0.10** -0.03 
 (0.51) (-2.58) (-1.69) 
        MB 0.06 0.03 0.01* 
 (1.47) (1.78) (1.96) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.09 0.03 
No. of Firms 2966 2958 602 
No. of Obs. 8121 8116 2809 
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Table 6 
Robustness Test: Propensity Score Matched DiD with Cross-listed Firms  
Table 6 reports the results of DiD regression of a subsample of treated and control firms based on propensity score 
matching (PSM) prior to CGR enforcement. Panel A presents parameter estimates from the probit model used to 
estimate propensity scores for larger sized treated firms and firms cross-listed in international exchanges as at or 
before 2004 (alternative control firms), as shown in Table 2. The dependent variable is one if the firm is cross-listed 
and zero if it belongs to the uppermost size decile of treated firms and is not cross-listed. Model 1 of Panel A reports 
parameter estimates with the entire sub-sample of uppermost size decile treated firms and cross-listed firms without 
PSM, whereas Model 2 reports estimates with a propensity score matched 81-pair subsample. Heteroscedasticity 
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are included in both Models in Panel A. Panel B 
presents DiD regression for the matched firms as given by equation:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate 
investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the notes to 
Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 81 matched treated firms using PSM and 
zero for the 81 firms cross-listed in international exchanges as at or before 2004. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of firm level controls 
that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership concentration (OwnCon) and market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 
control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). Panel C presents 
univariate DiD estimates of the matched treated and control groups. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Models [1] and [2] report regression without and with controls. 
The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 2007. Source: CMIE database. 
Panel A: Pre-match Propensity Score Regression and Post-match Diagnostic Regression 
 
                           Dummy = 1 if cross-listed;  
                                            0 if in uppermost size decile treated firms and not cross-listed. 
Pre-match Post-match 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] 
Size 0.28*** 0.15 
 (3.89) (0.81) 
   
Leverage 0.01 0.01 
 (0.55) (0.03) 
   
Liquidity -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.51) (-0.06) 
   
OwnCon -0.04*** -0.03 
 (-3.69) (-0.79) 
   
MB 0.03** 0.02 
 (2.19) (1.04) 
   
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Intercept -2.15*** -2.13*** 
 (-4.15) (-3.42) 
Observations 1364 648 
Pseudo R2 0.2371 0.08 
p-value of 𝜒2 0.00 0.41 
Table 6 Continued… 
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Table 6 Continued… 
Panel B: DiD Regression of Propensity Score Matched Treated and Control Group. 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
 [Model 
1] 
[Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
DiD 0.66*** 0.52*** 7.98*** 9.21*** 0.99*** 0.56*** 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)] (4.41) (3.96) (4.68) (2.86) (2.97) (4.49) 
       
Size  0.23  -0.41  -0.21 
  (-1.09)  (-0.35)  (-1.56) 
       
Leverage  -0.00  0.04  -0.14 
  (-0.13)  (0.24)  (-1.22) 
       
Liquidity  -0.01  -0.05  -0.06 
  (-1.07)  (-0.36)  (-1.27) 
       
OwnCon  -0.02  -0.11  -0.01 
  (-1.26)  (-1.81)  (-1.87) 
       
MB  0.04***  1.33**  0.15*** 
  (3.36)  (4.43)  (3.26) 
       
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.09 
No. of Firms 162 162 162 162 104 104 
No. of Obs. 1296 1296 1296 1296 832 832 
 
Panel C. Univariate DiD for earnings-volatility, capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
 Mean Treated 
Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean Control 
Difference 
(After-Before) 
Mean DiD Estimator 
(treated-Control) 
earnings-volatility 0.96*** -0.20 1.16*** 
 (3.88) (-0.76) (2.98) 
    
capital expenditure 10.29*** -1.63 11.92*** 
 (3.06) (-1.07) (2.76) 
    
R&D expenditure 0.51** 0.05 0.46** 
 (2.35) (0.29) (2.33) 
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Table 7. 
Placebo Tests 
Table 7 reports the results from different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by Earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate investment:  capital expenditure and R&D expenditure 
as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for treated firms and zero 
otherwise. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for two years after and including a false-shock year (FSY) and zero for two years before the 
FSY. We take years 2002 and 2006 as two different FSYs resulting in two false experiments and report in Models 1 and 2 for each proxy of risk-taking. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector 
of firm level controls that includes size, leverage, liquidity, ownership concentration (OwnCon) and market-to-book (MB).  𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 control for the fixed effects of 
firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following 
Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: 
CMIE database. 
 
earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
(FSY=2002)   (FSY=2006)   (FSY=2002)   (FSY=2006)   (FSY=2002)   (FSY=2006)   
DiD-Placebo -0.06 -0.39 0.93 2.31 0.02 0.15 
1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) (-0.20) (-1.17) (0.02) (1.26) (1.46) (1.76) 
       Size -0.89** -0.29** 3.40*** 2.85*** -0.08** -0.59*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.63) (4.43) (5.14) (-2.41) (-6.88) 
       Leverage -0.03 -0.14*** 0.46** 0.52*** 0.00 -0.01 
 (-1.15) (-3.27) (2.32) (3.25) (0.09) (-0.33) 
       Liquidity 0.00 0.00 -0.08** -0.19** -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.54) (0.32) (-2.05) (-2.60) (-0.59) (-1.66) 
       OwnCon  -0.01  -0.04  -0.00 
  (-1.37)  (-0.97)  (-0.60) 
       MB 0.01 0.10*** 0.02 0.06* 0.07* 0.00* 
 (0.14) (3.47) (0.07) (1.91) (1.82) (1.87) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.04 
No. of Firms 2966 2966 2958 2958 638 639 
No. of Obs. 7416 7621 7470 7696 2136 2139 
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Table 8 
Possible Channels of Increase in Risk-taking 
Table 8 reports the univariate results of different channels of increase in risk-taking. Dividend Yield is the ratio 
of dividend paid per share to market price per share of firm’s common stock. Amihud Illiquidity Ratio is the 
annual average of the ratio of absolute return to the daily trading volume. Days with Zero Return is number of 
trading days with zero return as a proportion of total trading days in a year. Foreign Equity Ownership is the ratio 
of number of shares held by foreign non-promoting investors to total non-promoting shareholders. Independent 
Board is computed as a ratio of the number of independent board members to total board members. All variables 
except Amihud Illiquidity Ratio are expressed in percentages. Treated firms include firms affected by CGR and 
Control firms include those unaffected by the reform. The before period is 2000-2003 and after period is 2004-
2007. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: 
CMIE database. Sample period: 2000-2007. 
 Firms 
Before 
[1] 
After 
[2] 
Mean Difference 
[2-1] 
DiD Estimator 
Dividend 
Yield 
Control  1.46 1.44 -0.02  
   (-0.15) -0.33*** 
Treated  1.66 1.31 -0.35*** (5.36) 
   (-7.48)  
      
Amihud 
Illiquidity 
Ratio 
Control  0.2798 0.1913 -0.088**  
   (-2.20) -0.097*** 
Treated  0.2441 0.0583 -0.186*** (-10.05) 
   (-20.31)  
      
Days with 
Zero Return 
 
Control  10.13 11.82 1.69***  
   (2.97) -7.86*** 
Treated  16.72 10.55 -6.17*** (7.89) 
   (-14.19)  
      
Foreign Equity 
Ownership 
 
Control  2.72 3.03 0.31  
   (0.64) 5.81*** 
Treated  3.42 9.54 6.12*** (9.54) 
   (20.04)  
      
Independent 
Board 
Control  39.59 41.76 2.17***  
   (3.69) 5.54*** 
Treated  36.78 44.49 7.71*** (6.61) 
    (12.44)  
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Table 9 
Ownership Concentration and the Role of CGR 
Table 9 reports the results of different specifications of the regression equation: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜔. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜒. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝑖𝑡 . 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 is risk-taking proxied by earnings-volatility. We further use two additional proxies of corporate investment:  capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure as dependent variables. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 1. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms 
affected by Clause-49 and zero otherwise; 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero otherwise. 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the two-year average of the percentage of promoters’ shareholding before the enforcement of Clause-49.  𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm level control 
variables. Firm level controls include size, leverage, liquidity and market-to-book (MB). 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
is the error term. 𝜔 captures the effect of CGR on risk-taking (investments) over the cross-section of ownership concentration of the treated firms before 
enforcement. Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Models [1] and [2] report regression 
without and with controls for sample firms with non-missing control variables for each risk-taking measure.  The sample period ranges from year 2000 to 
2007.Source: CMIE database. 
 earnings-volatility capital expenditure R&D expenditure 
[Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 1] [Model 2] 
DiDiD-OwnCon 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1)]. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] (4.41) (3.71) (3.94) (3.11) (4.09) (3.95) 
       
Interaction-Treated-OwnCon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1).𝑂𝑤𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (0.68) (0.69) (0.60) 
       
Size  -0.01**  0.60**  -0.40* 
  (-2.88)  (2.70)  (-1.90) 
       
Leverage  -0.00  0.20  -0.00 
  (-0.35)  (0.70)  (-0.14) 
       
Liquidity  -0.00  -0.36*  -0.02 
  (-1.19)  (-2.03)  (-0.28) 
       
OwnCon  -0.01*  -0.17  -0.00 
  (-1.85)  (-1.13)  (-0.45) 
       
MB  0.00***  2.03***  0.01*** 
  (4.03)  (4.91)  (2.41) 
Firm and Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 
No. of Firms 2966 2966 2958 2958 667 667 
No. of Obs. 14845 14845 14859 14859 3580 3580 
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Table 10 
Value Implication of Risk-Taking 
Table 10 reports the results of different specifications of the following specification: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜑. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1). 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1). 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽. [1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1] + 𝜆. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) + 𝜌. 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕. 𝜹+𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡  is Tobin’s Q calculated as a ratio of market value of total assets to its book value. 1(𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒49=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
for firms affected by Clause-49 and zero otherwise; 1(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for years including and after 2004 and zero 
otherwise. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of firm level control variables, which include size, leverage, book liquidity and ownership-concentration (OwnCon).  Risk-taking is 
gauged by earnings-volatility. We further use two other proxies of investments including capital expenditure and R&D expenditure as independent variables of 
interest. Variables are as defined in the notes to Table1. 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 control for the fixed effects of firm and year respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year levels following Petersen (2009). t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. Source: CMIE database. The sample period ranges from year 2000 
to 2007. 
 [Model 1] [Model 2] [Model 3] [Model 4] [Model 5] [Model 6] [Model 7] [Model 8] [Model 9] 
Triple Interaction-earnings volatility 0.04*** 0.05***     0.05*** 0.03***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦] (9.47) (5.01)     (5.17) (3.00)  
          
Triple Interaction-capital expenditure   0.01*** 0.01***   0.01*** 0.01***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒]   (9.40) (4.94)   (5.16) (2.91)  
          
Triple Interaction-R&D expenditure     0.06*** 0.06***  0.06***  
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1. 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒]     (2.88) (3.28)  (7.02)  
          
DiD  0.50***  0.27*  0.59*** 0.51* 0.38* 0.89*** 
[1𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒−49=1. 1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟=1]  (2.86)  (2.03)  (2.85) (2.00) (2.05) (4.47) 
          
Size  0.51***  0.48***  0.54*** 0.51*** 0.73*** 0.54*** 
  (5.34)  (3.80)  (3.32) (4.98) (4.33) (4.92) 
          
Leverage  0.08**  0.08***  0.08* 0.08*** 0.07 0.09*** 
  (2.58)  (2.82)  (1.95) (2.62) (1.35) (3.34) 
          
Liquidity  -0.01***  -0.00**  -0.01 -0.00** -0.00 -0.01** 
  (-3.50)  (-2.16)  (-0.33) (-2.28) (-0.14) (-2.40) 
          
OwnCon  0.01  0.01  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (1.75)  (1.65)  (0.48) (1.64) (1.30) (0.98) 
Firm and Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (within) 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.04 
No. of Firms 3755 2966 3782 2958 838 667 2601 667 2700 
No. of Obs. 25144 14845 25842 14859 5067 3580 14564 3674 14930 
 
 
  
Figure 1 
Timeline of enforcement of Clause-49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
21 Feb. 2000 
 
 
Clause-49 
appended to 
listing 
agreement. 
Only newly listed 
companies have 
to comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2001 
 
Group 1 
Large firms that 
are listed as 
Flag A in 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange Ltd. 
have to comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2002 
 
 
Group 2 
Mid-sized firms 
with net worth 
history ≥INR 250 
million or paid-up 
capital ≥INR100 
million at any point 
in time have to 
comply. 
 
31 Mar. 2003 
 
Group 3  
Small-sized 
firms with 
paid-up capital 
≥INR 30 
million have to 
comply. 
 
 
12 Oct. 2004 
 
 
Section 23E 
mandates severe 
financial and 
criminal penalties 
for non-
compliance with 
Clause-49 
provisions. 
 
Clause-49 
  
Figure 2 
Time-series plot of earnings-volatility of Propensity Score matched Treated and Control firms 
 
Note: Here, we plot the annual average of the earnings-volatility of Propensity Matched Treated and 
Control firms over the study period of 2000-2007. Before-CGR period is 2000 to 2003 and After-
CGR period is 2004 to 2007. We calculate earnings-volatility as a three-year rolling standard 
deviation of operating earnings where operating earnings is EBITDA scaled by total assets expressed 
as a percentage. Source: CMIE database. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Stylized Mandated Provisions of Clause-49 
(Transcribed from http://indianboards.com/files/clause_49.pdf) 
1. Requirement of independent directors:  
 Fifty percent of board of directors are required to be independent in the case where the Chairman is the 
executive director and one third (33%) if the Chairman is a non-executive. 
 Definition of Independent Directors: Independent directors are defined as those not having any material 
pecuniary relationship with the company, not related to Board members or one level below Board, and 
no prior relationship with the Company for the last three years. Nominee Directors of Financial 
Institutions are considered to be independent. 
2. Board requirements and limitations: 
 Board required to meet four times a year (with a maximum of three months between meetings). 
 Limit on the number of committees a director can be on is 10, but only 5 for which a director can be the 
Chair of the committee. 
 Code of conduct is required. 
3. Composition of audit committee: 
 The committee should have at least three directors of which two-thirds are required to be independent.  
 All the members of the audit committee should be financially literate. 
 At least one member of the audit committee should have accounting or financial management 
experience. 
4. Role and power of audit committee: 
 The committee should conduct a minimum of four meetings in an accounting year with a gap between 
two meetings not exceeding four months. 
 The major role of the committee is to review statutory and internal audits, obtain outside legal or other 
professional advice, and review whistle-blower programmes, if any. 
5. Disclosures: 
The clause requires firms to disclose the following: 
 Related party transactions, 
 Accounting treatments and departures, 
 Risk management, 
 Annual report, including discussion of internal controls adequacy, significant trends, risks, and 
opportunities, 
 Proceeds from offerings, 
 Compensation for directors (including non-executives), and obtain shareholders’ approval, 
 Details of compliance history for the last three years, and corporate governance reports (and 
disclose adoption, if any, of mandatory and non-mandatory requirements) and  
 Corporate governance reports. 
 
6. Certifications by CEO and CFO: 
 Financial statements,  
 Effectiveness of internal controls, and 
 Inform audit committee of any significant changes in the above. 
 
7. Certifications by auditor or company secretary: 
 Compliance with corporate governance. 
  
Appendix 2 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable: Risk-taking   
earnings-volatility 
Three year rolling standard deviation of operating earnings where 
operating earnings is EBITDA scaled by total assets expressed as a 
percentage. 
Derived from CMIE 
Dependent variable: Corporate Investment    
capital expenditure 
Increase in Long-term Assets as a percentage of previous year’s total 
long-term assets expressed as a percentage. 
Derived from CMIE 
R&D expenditure 
 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of total assets. Derived from CMIE 
Control variables 
Size Ln (book value of total assets). Derived from CMIE 
Leverage Book debt to equity ratio. CMIE 
Liquidity Book value of Liquid Assets/Current Liability. CMIE 
Ownership concentration 
Shares owned by promoters (insiders) as percentage of total shares 
outstanding. 
CMIE 
MB Market-to-book value of equity. CMIE 
Industry 22 industries as classified in Appendix 3. Derived from CMIE 
 
  
Appendix 3 
Industries classification 
In this Table, we provide an industry breakdown of our sample. 
Industry Code Industries No. of firms Observations 
1 Agricultural Products 153 1024 
2 Automobiles and Transport 163 1247 
3 Cement and Abrasives 48 361 
4 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 446 2905 
5 Computers, Software and ITs 238 1780 
6 Construction 196 1370 
7 Consumer Electronics 63 474 
8 Diversified 76 570 
9 Engines and Equipment 208 1623 
10 Iron, Steel and Metals 246 1832 
11 Leather and Rubber Products 34 253 
12 Media and Entertainment 66 418 
13 Minerals Products 21 155 
14 Miscellaneous Items 37 182 
15 Other Retail and Specialties 126 984 
16 Paper and Wood Products  71 457 
17 Plastics and Polymers 154 1186 
18 Processed Food and Tobacco 76 591 
19 Services 491 2872 
20 Textiles 325 2040 
21 Trading 535 3757 
22 Wires and Cables 66 503 
  Total 3839 26584 
 
 
